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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 William Dahl pleaded guilty to multiple offenses 
involving the use of interstate commerce to engage minors in 
sexual activities.1 Because Dahl had several prior Delaware 
                                              
1 Dahl was charged with and pleaded guilty to three counts of 
attempted use of an interstate commerce facility to entice a 
minor to engage in sexual conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2422(b); one count of attempted enticement of a minor to 
travel in interstate commerce to engage in sexual activity, in 
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convictions related to sexual activity with minors, the District 
Court sentenced him under the Repeat and Dangerous Sex 
Offender guideline, United States Sentencing Guideline 
§ 4B1.5, to the top-range sentence of 293 months in prison to 
be followed by 20 years of supervised release. Dahl argues 
for the first time on appeal that the District Court’s 
application of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 was plain error because his 
prior state convictions are not categorically “sex offense 
convictions” under the Guidelines. In light of recent Supreme 
Court rulings, we agree and will remand for resentencing. 
 
I.  
 In 2013, Dahl placed several advertisements on 
Craigslist seeking sexual encounters with young males. Two 
undercover law-enforcement agents, acting independently, 
replied to the advertisements, representing themselves as 
fifteen-year-old boys. Through email communications over 
the next few weeks, Dahl engaged in graphic sexual 
conversations, requested photographs of the boys, and 
attempted to arrange in-person sexual encounters. One of the 
undercover agents eventually agreed to meet Dahl at his 
house, ostensibly for a sexual encounter. Dahl was arrested 
after the detective called off the meeting. 
 
 Dahl has several prior Delaware convictions related to 
sexual activity with minors. Of relevance here, in 1991 he 
was convicted of first- and third-degree unlawful sexual 
contact relating to encounters with two seventeen-year-old 
boys. And in 2001, Dahl was convicted of second-degree 
                                                                                                     
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a); and one count of transfer of 
obscene material to a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470. 
4 
 
unlawful sexual contact relating to an encounter with a 
fourteen-year-old boy in 1999. 
 
 Based on the application of U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 (the 
prohibited sexual conduct guideline) and § 4A1.1 (the 
criminal history guideline), Dahl’s Guidelines range would 
have been 121–151 months’ imprisonment (Total Offense 
Level 29; Criminal History Category IV2), absent any 
sentencing enhancements. However, the probation officer 
recommended, and the District Court found, that Dahl’s prior 
state convictions were the equivalent of convictions for 
federal aggravated sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (a 
Chapter 109A offense), and therefore “sex offense 
conviction” predicates under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5. Accordingly, 
Dahl’s Total Offense Level was increased from 29 to 34,3 and 
                                              
2 Based on Dahl’s Presentence Report, the District Court 
determined Dahl’s Total Offense Level of 29 and Criminal 
History Category of IV as follows: 
Base Offense Level: 28 
 +2 (for enticement through the use of a 
computer under § 2G1.3(b)(3)) 
 +2 (as a grouping adjustment for multiple 
counts under § 3D1.4) 
 -3 (for acceptance of responsibility under § 
3E1.1) 
 
Criminal History Category: IV (based on nine criminal 
history points). 
 
3 Although § 4B1.5 raised Dahl’s offense level to 37, this was 
reduced by three levels because Dahl accepted responsibility 
for his conduct. 
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his Criminal History Category was increased from IV to V, 
yielding a Guidelines range of 235–293 months’ 
imprisonment. The District Court found the high end of the 
range was appropriate and sentenced Dahl to 293 months’ 
imprisonment. 
 
 Dahl objected to the application of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5, 
but on different grounds than he asserts on appeal. The issue 
of whether Dahl’s prior Delaware convictions were 
improperly categorized as “sex offense convictions” under 
federal law was therefore unpreserved. We review an 
unpreserved objection for plain error.4 
 
II.  
 Dahl contends the District Court committed plain error 
by failing to apply the categorical approach in determining 
whether his Delaware first- and third-degree unlawful sexual 
contact convictions constitute federal sex offense convictions 
under the federal repeat offender statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
2426(b)(1)(B), and therefore subject Dahl to a heightened 
sentence under the career sexual offender guideline, § 4B1.5. 
The government responds that we should not apply the 
categorical approach, but should instead look to the actual 
                                              
4 We review whether a prior conviction qualifies a defendant 
for a recidivist sentencing enhancement de novo. United 
States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 2014). When 
there was no objection below, the challenging party must also 
meet the requirements of the plain-error standard by 
demonstrating the error is clear, prejudicial, and affects the 
fairness or reputation of the judicial proceeding. United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). 
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conduct of conviction to determine whether it would 
constitute an offense under the federal statute. Specifically, it 
contends U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 and 18 U.S.C. § 2426(b)(1)(B) 
require a factual approach because they refer to the requisite 
predicate offense in case-specific terms. Section 
2426(b)(1)(B) refers to “a conviction for an offense . . . 
consisting of conduct that would have been an offense” under 
certain federal statutes, and § 4B1.5 refers to a “sex offense 
conviction” as “any offense [under 18 U.S.C. § 
2426(b)(1)(B)], if the offense was perpetrated against a 
minor.” We disagree with the government. The District Court 
erred when it failed to apply the categorical approach.  
 
 The Supreme Court has explained that to determine 
whether a defendant’s prior federal or state conviction 
qualifies as a predicate offense, sentencing courts must apply 
the categorical approach and “‘look only to the statutory 
definitions’—i.e., the elements—of a defendant’s prior 
offenses, and not ‘to the particular facts underlying those 
convictions.’” Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 
2283 (2013) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 
600 (1990)). If the statute of conviction has the same 
elements as the federal crime, then the prior conviction can 
serve as a predicate. “[S]o too if the statute defines the crime 
more narrowly, because anyone convicted under that law is 
‘necessarily . . . guilty of all the [generic crime’s] elements.’” 
Id. (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599). But if the relevant state 
or federal statute “sweeps more broadly than the generic 
crime, a conviction under that law cannot count as a[] . . . 
predicate, even if the defendant actually committed the offense 
in its generic form.” Id. (emphasis added). In other words, we 
look to the elements of the prior offense “to ascertain the least 
culpable conduct hypothetically necessary to sustain a 
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conviction under the statute.” Hernandez-Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 
764 F.3d 281, 285 (3d Cir. 2014). The elements, not the facts, 
are key. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283. 
 
 In Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), 
the Supreme Court explained that the “categorical approach” 
applies notwithstanding a predicate statute’s reference to 
conduct. The Court found the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 
(ACCA’s) residual clause void for vagueness because 
application of the categorical approach compelled courts to 
determine the unconstitutionally vague “ordinary case” of a 
predicate statute’s violation. Id. at 2557–58. But the Court 
upheld the use of the categorical approach generally, and 
rejected the argument by the government (and Justice Alito in 
dissent) that the “conduct” language of ACCA should trigger 
a factual approach. See id. at 2561–62 (“[T]he dissent urges 
us to save the residual clause from vagueness by interpreting 
it to refer to the risk posed by the particular conduct in which 
the defendant engaged . . . . In other words, the dissent 
suggests that we jettison for the residual clause (though not 
for the enumerated crimes) the categorical approach. . . . We 
decline the dissent’s invitation.”). The Johnson Court 
explained that the important textual reference for triggering 
the categorical approach is “conviction,” not “conduct.” Id. at 
2562 (“This emphasis on convictions indicates that ‘Congress 
intended the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the 
defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain 
categories, and not to the facts underlying the prior 
convictions.’” (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600)).  
 
 In a recent decision, Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2243 (2016), the Court emphasized that a sentencing 
enhancement’s use of the phrase “conviction” indicates 
8 
 
Congress’s intent to apply the categorical approach. 136 S. 
Ct. at 2252 (“By enhancing the sentence of a defendant who 
has three ‘previous convictions’ . . . rather than one who has 
thrice committed that crime—Congress indicated that the 
sentencer should ask only about whether ‘the defendant had 
been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories,’ 
and not about what the defendant had actually done.” 
(quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600)).5  
 
 Johnson and Mathis looked at ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(1)-(2)(B)(ii), whereas here we examine a part of the 
Code dealing with repeat sex offenders, 18 U.S.C. § 
2426(b)(1)(B). But the categorical approach is not unique to 
ACCA, Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2251 n.2, and both ACCA and 
the repeat offender statute use the terms “conduct” and 
“conviction” in a similar manner.  
 
 ACCA’s residual clause’s description of a predicate 
conviction is: 
 
[A] conviction[] for . . . any crime . . . that . . . involves 
                                              
5 The Supreme Court also noted in Mathis that allowing a 
sentencing judge to find facts other than “the simple fact of a 
prior conviction” would raise “serious Sixth Amendment 
concerns” because “only a jury, and not a judge, may find 
facts that increase a maximum penalty.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 
2252 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 
(2000)). And further, “an elements-focus avoids unfairness to 
defendants” as “[s]tatements of ‘non-elemental fact’ in the 
records of prior convictions are prone to error precisely 
because their proof is unnecessary.” Id. at 2253 (quoting 
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2288–89). 
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conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another; 
 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (emphasis added).  
The repeat offender statute’s description of a predicate 
conviction is:  
 
“[A] conviction for an offense . . . consisting of 
conduct that would have been an offense under a 
chapter referred to in paragraph (1) if the conduct had 
occurred within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.  
 
Id. § 2426(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The government’s 
contention that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is “materially different” 
from § 2426(b)(1)(B) because it does not refer to “conduct” is 
misplaced. Furthermore, both statutes refer to “conviction”—
the textual trigger for application of the categorical approach. 
See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562.6  
 
 The government also contends that a factual inquiry, 
not a categorical approach, is required because the statute 
includes the qualifying language, “if the offense was 
perpetrated against a minor.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 cmt. 3(A)(i). 
But as we held, and the Supreme Court affirmed, in Nijhawan 
                                              
6 Moreover, for the same reasons set forth in Mathis regarding 
the use of the categorical approach under ACCA, applying 
the categorical approach to § 4B1.5 avoids possible 
unfairness to defendants that would result from basing an 
increased penalty on something not legally necessary to a 
prior conviction. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2253. 
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v. Attorney General, 523 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), the factual inquiry 
triggered by qualifying language is limited to the facts 
relevant to the qualification itself. The categorical approach 
continues to apply to the rest of the statute’s non-qualifying 
elements. 
 
 The issue in Nijhawan v. Holder was whether, and to 
what extent, the categorical approach should be applied to the 
loss amount under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), which 
makes an alien removable if he was previously “convicted of . 
. . an offense that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to 
the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” See 8 U.S.C 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). We concluded the loss amount was not 
an element of the crime, which would require a jury to 
“actually convict[] [the] defendant of a loss in excess of 
$10,000” to be subject to removal under §§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) 
and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 392. Rather, it 
was a “qualifier” because it was prefaced with the language 
“in which”—“‘express[ing] such a specificity of fact that it 
almost begs an adjudicator to examine the facts at issue.’” Id. 
at 393 (quoting Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 161 (3d Cir. 
2004)). A holding to the contrary “would essentially gut 
every deportability standard containing the ‘in which’ or 
other analogous qualifying language.” Id. at 391. Because it 
was not an element, we found it proper to depart from the 
formal categorical approach, and look “‘into the facts . . . at 
issue.’” Id. at 393 (quoting Singh, 383 F.3d at 161). But we 
did not abandon the categorical approach in analyzing the rest 
of the statute. Id. at 396 (“[N]either we nor [other circuit 
courts] have abandoned the . . . [categorical] approach. 
Indeed, we still resort to it in the initial phase of our analysis 
because [the underlying statute] instructs us to decide whether 
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the alien has been convicted of a crime involving fraud or 
deceit.”).  
 
 The Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the $10,000 
threshold is not an element of the crime, but refers to the 
factual circumstances surrounding commission of the crime. 
As the Court explained, the “monetary threshold applies to 
the specific circumstances surrounding an offender’s 
commission of a fraud and deceit crime on a specific 
occasion.” 557 U.S. at 40. But the Court cautioned that the 
categorical approach should still be applied to the generic 
elements of the statute. See, e.g., id. at 38 (“The . . . 
‘aggravated felony’ statute, unlike ACCA, contains some 
language that refers to generic crimes and some language that 
almost certainly refers to the specific circumstances in which 
a crime was committed. The question before us then is to 
which category subparagraph (M)(i) belongs.”); id. at 40 
(“We conclude that Congress did not intend subparagraph 
(M)(i)’s monetary threshold to be applied categorically . . . 
.”). 
 
 The government contends, and Dahl does not contest, 
that the “perpetrated against a minor” provision “is not an 
element of many of the crimes described in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2426(b)(1)(A) or (B).” Br. Appellee 15. We agree, but 
Nijhawan dictates that although we delve into the facts to 
determine whether the victim was a minor, we continue to 
apply the categorical approach to the underlying elements of 
the predicate offense.  
 
 Our holding in United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651 
(3d Cir. 2012), is not to the contrary. Pavulak involved the 
application of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e), which provides for a 
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mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment for 
defendants who are recidivist child sex offenders. 700 F.3d at 
671 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e)(1)).7 The statute applies to 
previous state sex offenses that would be “punishable by 
more than one year in prison” and involve “conduct that 
would be a Federal sex offense” if there were federal 
jurisdiction. Id. (quoting § 3559(e)(2)(B)). 
 
 The government contends that Pavulak allows for a 
factual inquiry into the underlying facts of this case because, 
as in Pavulak, “the federal sentencing enhancement invites 
inquiry into the underlying facts of the case,” allowing the 
district judge to “evaluate whether the factual elements of the 
analogous federal crime were necessarily proven at the time 
of the defendant’s conviction on the state charges.” Id. at 672 
                                              
7 Because Pavulak was litigated before Alleyne v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), which extended Apprendi to 
mandatory-minimum sentences, the defendant advanced an 
Apprendi claim that § 3559(e)(1) increased his maximum 
punishment, claiming this punishment would otherwise be 
only fifty years under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). Pavulak, 700 F.3d 
at 673. Instead of disposing of the defendant’s claim on the 
ground that Apprendi does not apply to recidivist 
enhancements, see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, we embarked 
on an extensive analysis of whether the defendant’s statutory 
maximum was increased by § 3559(e)(1), Pavulak, 700 F.3d 
at 673. This inquiry required determining what the statutory 
maximum would have been under § 2251(e), which depended 
on whether the defendant had two or more prior convictions 
“relating to the sexual exploitation of children,” in which case 
§ 2251(e) would supply the same life maximum as § 
3559(e)(1). Pavulak, 700 F.3d. at 673–75. 
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(internal citation and quotations omitted). As an example of a 
statute requiring a factual inquiry, we noted that 18 U.S.C. § 
3559(e) focuses on whether the state offense involves 
“‘conduct that would be a Federal sex offense’ and thereby 
invit[es] an inquiry into the facts underlying the defendant’s 
conviction.” Id. at 673. We described this as applying the 
“modified categorical approach.” Id. 
 
 Categorizing this inquiry as the “modified categorical 
approach” was incorrect. We conflated the modified 
categorical approach with a factual approach that is 
appropriate only in “special circumstances.” Under the 
modified categorical approach, courts may look to a limited 
set of judicial documents to determine which of the multiple 
alternative crimes listed in a statute was the crime of 
conviction. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284–85 (offering as 
examples, the terms of a plea agreement or the transcript of a 
plea colloquy); United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185, 189–90 
(3d Cir. 2014). But they may not, as Pavulak suggests, 
consider the facts for additional sentencing purposes. See 
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 (“The modified approach thus 
acts not as an exception, but instead as a tool [of the 
categorical approach]. It retains the categorical approach’s 
central feature: a focus on the elements, rather than the facts, 
of a crime. And it preserves the categorical approach’s basic 
method: comparing those elements with the generic 
offense’s.”).  
 
 Before Pavulak and since, we have applied the 
categorical approach to Guidelines recidivism provisions 
when there is no breach of a statutory maximum or Apprendi 
violation. See, e.g., Brown, 765 F.3d at 189 n.2; United States 
v. Hopkins, 577 F.3d 507, 510 (3d Cir. 2009). In fact, it has 
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never been the law that, absent an Apprendi violation, there 
are no limits to the scope of permissible fact-finding at 
sentencing. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24–26 
(2005); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–02.8  
 
Moreover, our language in Pavulak conflating the 
modified-categorical approach with a factual inquiry was 
dicta that we did not follow even in Pavulak itself. Instead, 
we applied the categorical approach to assess whether the 
defendant’s prior convictions qualified him for the life 
maximum under § 2251(e), rejecting the “case-by-case 
analysis” urged by Pavulak that looked at whether the 
“conduct underlying his prior convictions ‘involved the 
[federally prohibited conduct].’” Pavulak, 700 F.3d at 674 
(quoting United States v. Randolph, 364 F.3d 118, 122 (3d 
Cir. 2004)).  
 
III. 
 Applying the categorical approach, we find the District 
Court erred in its application of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 because the 
Delaware statutes under which Dahl was convicted are 
broader than the federal aggravated sexual abuse statutes, and 
                                              
8 The categorical approach was not developed to avoid 
Apprendi violations—the categorical approach predates 
Apprendi by ten years—but to guarantee fairness in recidivist 
sentencing by avoiding inquiries into the factual 
circumstances underlying prior convictions. See Shepard, 544 
U.S. at 24–26 (noting Apprendi concerns as a “further reason” 
for the categorical approach); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–02. 
The avoidance of an Apprendi violation is just one 
justification for the approach. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2252. 
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therefore do not qualify as predicate offenses. 
 
 Section 4B1.5 of the Sentencing Guidelines enhances 
the recommended sentence for a “sex crime” when the 
defendant has at least one prior “sex offense conviction.” 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a). This Guideline defines “sex offense 
conviction” as “(I) any offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 
2426(b)(1)(A) or (B), if the offense was perpetrated against a 
minor, that (II) does not include trafficking in, receipt of, or 
possession of, child pornography.” Id. § 4B1.5, cmt. 3(A)(ii). 
 
 Section 2426(b)(1)(A)-(B) in turn, describes a “prior 
sex offense conviction” as: 
 
(A) [any offense] under [Title 18 chapter 117], chapter 




(B) [any offense] under State law . . . consisting of 
conduct that would have been an offense under a 
chapter referred to in paragraph (1) if the conduct had 
occurred within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2426(b)(1). 
 The government claims Dahl’s 1991 Delaware 
convictions for first- and third-degree sexual contact are 
equivalent to a federal conviction for aggravated sexual abuse 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (a chapter 109A offense). Federal 




(a) By force or threat. Whoever . . . knowingly causes 
another person to engage in a sexual act— 
 




 (2) by threatening or placing that other person 
 in fear that any person will be subjected to 
 death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; 
 
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, 
imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. 
 
(b) By other means. Whoever . . . knowingly— 
 
 (1) renders another person unconscious and 
 thereby engages in a sexual act  with that 
 other person; or 
  
 (2) administers to another person by force or 
 threat of force, or without  knowledge or 
 permission of that person, a drug, intoxicant, or 
 other similar  substance and thereby— 
   
  (A) substantially impairs the ability of  
  that other person to  appraise or control  
  conduct; 
 
  and 
 
  (B) engages in a sexual act with that  




 or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this 
 title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or 
 both. 
 
(c) With children. Whoever . . . knowingly engages in 
a sexual act under the circumstances described in 
subsections (a) and (b) with another person who has 
attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age 
of 16 years (and is at least 4 years younger than the 
person so engaging), or attempts to do so, shall be 
fined under this title and imprisoned for not less than 
30 years or for life. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2241 (emphasis added). 
 
 “Sexual act” is defined under federal law as: 
(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the 
penis and the anus, and for purposes of this 
subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon 
penetration, however slight; 
 
(B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the 
mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus; 
 
(C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or 
genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by 
any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, 
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any 
person; or 
 
(D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, 
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of the genitalia of another person who has not attained 
the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, 
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire 
of any person. 
 
Id. § 2246(2). 
 Under the categorical approach, we look to the 
elements of the state statute as it existed at the time of the 
prior conviction. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598 (looking at 
Missouri’s second-degree burglary statutes in effect at the 
times of petitioner’s convictions). 
 
 A person in 1989 (the date of Dahl’s conduct giving 
rise to his 1991 convictions) would be guilty of unlawful 
sexual contact in the first degree in Delaware if: 
 
[I]n the course of committing unlawful sexual contact 
in the third degree or in the course of committing 
unlawful sexual contact in the second degree, or during 
the immediate flight from the crime, or during an 
attempt to prevent the reporting of the crime, he causes 
physical injury to the victim or he displays what 
appears to be a deadly weapon or dangerous 
instrument. 
 
11 Del. Code Ann. § 769 (1987).  
 First-degree unlawful sexual contact encompasses 
second- and third-degree unlawful sexual contact with the 
aggravating circumstance of physical injury or the display of 
a deadly or dangerous instrument. Id. Therefore, although 
Dahl was not convicted of second-degree unlawful sexual 
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contact in 1991, we must examine the elements of second-
degree unlawful sexual contact. A person in 1989 would be 
guilty of unlawful sexual contact in the second degree in 
Delaware if: 
 
[H]e intentionally has sexual contact with another 
person who is less than 16 years of age or causes the 
victim to have sexual contact with the person or a third 
person. 
 
11 Del. Code Ann. § 768 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 A person in 1989 would be guilty of unlawful sexual 
contact in the third degree in Delaware if: 
[H]e has sexual contact with another person or causes 
the victim to have sexual contact with him or a third 
person and he knows that the contact is either 
offensive to the victim or occurs without the victim’s 
consent. 
 
Id. § 767 (emphasis added).  
 
 Delaware law defined sexual contact in 1989 as: 
 
[A]ny intentional touching of the anus, breast, buttocks 
or genitalia of another person, which touching, under 
the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable person, is 
sexual in nature. Sexual contact shall also include 
touching of those specified areas when covered by 




66 Del. Laws, ch. 269, § 27 (1988) (codified as amended at 
11 Del. Code Ann. § 761(f) (1995)). 
 
 Comparing the Delaware statutes to the federal 
statutes, we find that Delaware first- and third-degree 
unlawful sexual contact are broader than federal aggravated 
sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241 in at least two ways, and 
therefore, Dahl’s prior offenses under these statutes do not 
qualify as “sex offense convictions” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5. 
 
 
 First, and most importantly, each Delaware statute 
prohibits “sexual contact,” whereas § 2241 prohibits “sexual 
act[s].” Compare 66 Del. Laws, ch. 269, § 27, with 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2241. Under the versions of Delaware’s unlawful sexual 
contact laws in place in 1989, sexual contact included 
touching genitalia and other specified areas through clothing. 
See 66 Del. Laws, ch. 269, § 27. But federal law defines 
“sexual act” more narrowly, requiring penetration or actual 
skin-to-skin contact between various specified body parts. See 
18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(A)-(C). And under federal law, the 
“intentional touching” of the genitalia of a person under 
sixteen years old is only a “sexual act” if it is skin-to-skin, 
i.e., “not through the clothing,” and is done with the “intent to 
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify a sexual 
desire of any person.” Id. § 2246(2)(D). 
 
 Federal law defines “sexual contact,” but this term is 
not included within 18 U.S.C. § 2241,9 nor is it correct to read 
                                              
9 The term “sexual contact” is used in other sections in 
Chapter 109A. See 18 U.S.C. § 2244 (defining when “sexual 
contact” is “abusive sexual contact”); id. § 2243. 
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“sexual contact” into the generic use of the term “contact” in 
the definition of “sexual act.” See United States v. Hayward, 
359 F.3d 631, 641 (3d Cir. 2004) (distinguishing a “sexual 
act,” which requires skin-to-skin touching, from “sexual 
contact,” for which “the touching could occur either directly 
or through the clothing,” and finding the defendant “could 
only have been sentenced to sexual contact, and not sexual 
abuse,” the latter of which requires a sexual act). 
 
 Even if it were correct to read “sexual contact” into the 
“contact” language of “sexual act,” the scope of the federal 
definition is narrower than Delaware’s definition. The federal 
definition limits criminal “sexual contact” to touching with 
the specific “intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or 
arouse or gratify” a sexual desire. See 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3). 
By contrast, Delaware’s definition omits this specific intent 
requirement and criminalizes intentional touching “which 
touching, under the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable 
person, is sexual in nature.” 66 Del. Laws, ch. 269, § 27 
(emphasis added). This reasonable person standard is broader 
than the federal law’s intent requirement.10 
                                              
10 See State v. Row, 1994 WL 45358, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 1, 1994) (unpublished) (“Under the . . . statute, the 
contact must be something more than a mere touching . . ., 
but something less than an attempt to arouse or gratify a 
sexual desire. Rather, the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the contact must lead a reasonable person, under the 
circumstances, to conclude the touching has sexual 
overtones.”); but cf. Dorcy v. City of Dover Bd. of Elections, 
1994 WL 146012, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 1994) 
(unpublished) (holding that Delaware’s definition of “sexual 
contact” was similar to Ohio’s, which requires a showing that 
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 Second, Delaware third-degree unlawful sexual 
contact in 1989 prohibited consensual contact the defendant 
nonetheless knew was “offensive to the victim.” 11 Del. Code 
Ann. § 767 (1987).11 By contrast, federal aggravated sexual 
abuse involves a nonconsensual sexual act. The defendant 
must either (1) use force against a person or “threaten[]or 
plac[e] that other person in fear that any person will be 
subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping,” 18 
U.S.C. § 2241(a), or (2) engage in a nonconsensual sexual act 
“by other means,” including rendering the victim unconscious 
and then engaging in a sexual act with the victim, or giving 
the victim a drug or similar substance that “substantially 
impairs the ability of that person to appraise or control 
conduct,” and then engaging in sex with the victim, id. 
§ 2241(b).12 
                                                                                                     
the defendant had “the purpose of sexually arousing or 
gratifying either person,” such that conduct covered by the 
Ohio law would be covered by the Delaware law). The 
language of 11 Del. Code Ann. § 761(f) was the same in 1989 
and 1994. 
11 This distinction is only applicable to Delaware third-degree 
unlawful sexual contact and first-degree unlawful sexual 
contact when encompassing third-degree unlawful sexual 
contact with the aggravating circumstances of physical injury 
or the display of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. 
See 11 Del. Code Ann. § 769 (1987). 
12 Also, the compulsion component of first-degree unlawful 
sexual contact under Delaware law may be broader in scope 
than the equivalent federal component because under 
Delaware law, the injury or “display[] [of] what appears to be 
a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument,” can occur at an 
unspecified time after the alleged sexual act occurs. 11 Del. 
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 Therefore, we agree with Dahl that Delaware first- and 
third-degree unlawful sexual contact “sweep more broadly” 
than federal aggravated sexual abuse. Dahl’s convictions for 
first- and third-degree unlawful sexual contact cannot be 
predicate sex offense convictions under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5. 
 
 Neither party contends the modified categorical 
approach is applicable here. Based on the possible disjunctive 
reading of Delaware’s first- and third-degree unlawful sexual 
contact statutes, however, such an approach might be 
appropriate. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 163–64 (3d 
Cir. 2004).13 But because any division of the statutes requires 
                                                                                                     
Code Ann. § 769 (1987) (a person may be guilty of first-
degree unlawful sexual contact if, “during an attempt to 
prevent the reporting of the crime, he causes physical injury 
to the victim or he displays what appears to be a deadly 
weapon or dangerous instrument”). By contrast, the 
compulsion component of federal aggravated sexual abuse 
must come before engaging in the sexual act. See 18 U.S.C. § 
2241. But the various compulsion components could be 
alternative elements, as opposed to alternative means, and 
therefore, the statute might be divisible. See, e.g., Mathis, 136 
S. Ct. at 2256–57. In any event, we do not decide this issue 
here. 
13 In Singh v. Ashcroft, we applied the categorical approach to 
a conviction under Delaware’s third-degree unlawful sexual 
contact statute, 11 Del. Code Ann. § 767 (1995). Singh, 383 
F.3d at 148, 163–64. Although § 767 was revised in 1995, 
there are no material differences between this version and the 
1987 version in place in 1989 when Dahl engaged in the 
conduct underlying his 1991 convictions. Compare 11 Del. 
Code Ann. § 767 (1995), with 11 Del. Code Ann. § 767 
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“sexual contact,” which under Delaware law is more 
expansive than the federal “sexual act,” see supra, either 
statute would still be broader than § 2241, or any other 
offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 2426(b)(1)(A).  
 
IV. 
 The District Court erred in failing to apply the 
categorical approach and subsequently applying U.S.S.G. § 
4B1.5. But because Dahl did not object to the application of § 
                                                                                                     
(1987). In Singh, we noted third-degree unlawful sexual 
contact is phrased in the disjunctive, “both with respect to its 
actus reus (which can be either (1) sexual contact or (2) 
causing sexual contact) and its mens rea (which can be either 
(a) knowing that the contact is offensive to the victim, or (b) 
knowing that the contact occurs without the victim’s 
consent).” Singh, 383 F.3d at 163. “[A]ny combination of 
actus reus and mens rea . . . suffice as the actus reus and 
mens rea of ‘sexual abuse.’” Id. The issue in Singh, however, 
was whether 11 Del. Code Ann. § 767 constituted “sexual 
abuse of a minor” under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
and the Delaware statute “[was] silent on the critical matter of 
the age of the victim.” Id. Therefore, although the statute was 
phrased in the disjunctive, it was “not phrased in the 
disjunctive in a relevant way” because either reading lacked 
the age component. Id. at 164. Here, as in Singh, we need not 
apply the modified categorical approach because the 
definition of “sexual contact” implicated in both first- and 
third-degree unlawful sexual contact is broader than the 





4B1.5 on the grounds he asserts here, the issue is 
unpreserved. We must therefore decide whether it was plain 
error for the District Court to not apply the categorical 
approach. Because the error was plain, and errors such as this 
affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial 
proceedings, we will exercise our discretion and find plain 
error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). 
 
Under Rule 52(b), we have the discretion “to correct 
the forfeited error” if (1) there is an error; (2) the error is 
plain; and (3) the error affects substantial rights. United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). If these “three prongs are 
satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the 
error” but our discretion “ought to be exercised only if the 
error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Puckett v. United States, 
556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736).  
 
For an error to be “plain,” it must be “clear or obvious 
rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” Puckett, 556 U.S. 
at 135. The government contends that if there was an error, it 
was not plain because our ruling in Pavulak suggests a judge 
may look at underlying facts to determine whether earlier 
conduct would have amounted to a specified federal offense. 
We recognize that “a new rule of law, set forth by an 
appellate court, cannot automatically lead that court to 
consider all contrary determinations by trial courts [as] 
plainly erroneous.” Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
1121, 1130 (2013). But Henderson clarified that we apply 
“Rule 52(b)’s words ‘plain error’ as of the time of appellate 
review.” Id. at 1128. Therefore, if the Supreme Court clarifies 
whether something is an error following sentencing, but 
before we decide a case on appeal, we must follow the 
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Supreme Court’s ruling.  
Given the Supreme Court’s holdings in Descamps and 
Nijhawan, we believe the law was clear at the time of Dahl’s 
sentencing that the categorical approach should have been 
applied. But even assuming the law was unclear when Dahl 
was sentenced in May, 2015, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Johnson one month later, and its most recent decision in 
Mathis, clarify that a statute’s reference to “conduct” does not 
invite a factual inquiry. Rather, the use of the phrase 
“conviction” indicates Congress’s intent “that the sentencer 
should ask only about whether ‘the defendant had been 
convicted of crimes falling within certain categories,’ and not 
about what the defendant had actually done.” Mathis, 136 S. 
Ct. at 2252 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600); see also 
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562. We have no doubt that if Dahl 
were to be sentenced today, the categorical approach would 
apply. Therefore, even if the error was not plain at sentencing, 
it is plain now. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 
467 (1997) (concluding that when there is “no doubt that if 
petitioner’s trial occurred today, the failure . . . would be an 
error,” this error is “plain”); cf. United States v. Stinson, 734 
F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding the error was clear in 
light of the plain language of the relevant Guidelines 
provision, despite the issue being one of first impression).  
 
We also hold, and the government does not contest, 
that this error affected substantial rights. Generally, “[i]t is the 
defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden 
of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 
734. But “[w]hen a defendant is sentenced under an incorrect 
Guidelines range—whether or not the defendant’s ultimate 
sentence falls within the correct range—the error itself can, 
and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable 
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probability of a different outcome absent the error.” Molina-
Martinez, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016); see also United 
States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]n 
error in application of the Guidelines that results in [the] use 
of a higher sentencing range should be presumed to affect the 
defendant’s substantial rights.”). The government can rebut 
this presumption if it can show “that the judge based the 
sentence he or she selected on factors independent of the 
Guidelines.” Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1347.  
 
Here, the sentencing judge referenced the initial 
guideline range, stating “I find no basis to vary downward 
from the advisory sentencing guidelines.” J.A. 101. 
Therefore, we cannot conclude, as would be required to 
affirm, “that the district court thought the sentence it chose 
was appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range.” 
Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1346. Nor can we conclude 
“that the sentencing court would have imposed the same 
sentence regardless of the [sex] offender designation” because 
“[t]o assume so—particularly when the record suggests that 
[the offender designation] played a role in the ultimate 
sentence imposed—would ‘place us in the zone of 
speculation and conjecture.’” United States v. Calabretta, No. 
14-3969, 2016 WL 3997215, at *9 (3d Cir. Jul. 26, 2016) 
(quoting United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 387 (3d 
Cir. 2013)). But we also cannot conclude that, had the judge 
known § 4B1.5 did not apply, he would not have nevertheless 
considered an upward departure—an integral feature of the 
Sentencing Guidelines. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 
81, 93–95 (1996). 
 
Finally, we must determine whether the error 
“seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
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judicial proceedings.’” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (quoting 
Olano, 507 U.S. at 736). We generally exercise our discretion 
to recognize a plain error in the misapplication of the 
Sentencing Guidelines. Knight, 266 F.3d at 206 n.7. This is 
because, as noted by a sister court of appeals, “few things . . . 
affect . . . the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity 
of the judicial process more than a reasonable probability an 
individual will linger longer in prison than the law demands 
only because of an obvious judicial mistake.” United States v. 
Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1335 (10th Cir. 2014). We 
will likewise exercise our discretion here. 
 
The government contends there was no miscarriage of 
justice because the undisputed facts make clear the defendant 
engaged in conduct amounting to federal sex offenses. Again, 
however, when determining whether a predicate offense 
qualifies under the Guidelines, sentencing courts should not 
look to the underlying facts of the prior offense, but to its 
elements. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283.14 
                                              
14 The government also contends Dahl’s 2001 conviction for 
second-degree unlawful sexual contact under 11 Del. Code 
Ann. § 768—resulting from conduct in 1999—qualified as a 
prior offense for the purposes of § 4B1.5 because it is 
analogous to 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a)(3). Section 2244(a)(3) 
criminalizes “knowingly engag[ing] in or caus[ing] sexual 
contact with or by another person, if so to do would violate . . 
. subsection (a) of section 2243 . . . had the sexual contact 
been a sexual act . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (emphasis 
added). The government’s argument is not persuasive. First, it 
is not clear the government could have used this offense to 
increase Dahl’s sentence. The government noted during 




We recognize the severity of Dahl’s offense, but the 
error here is plain under Johnson and Mathis, and affects 
Dahl’s substantial rights under Molina-Martinez. Therefore, 
we will vacate Dahl’s sentence and remand for resentencing 
in accordance with this opinion and in consideration of 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the Sentencing Guidelines.  
                                                                                                     
Federal equivalent crime [it was] relying upon for [Dahl’s] 
prior sex offense.” J.A. 57 (emphasis added). Second, the 
definition of “sexual contact” in Delaware in 1999 (which is 
incorporated in Delaware’s definition of second-degree 
unlawful sexual contact, see supra) was materially the same 
as the definition of “sexual contact” in Delaware in 1989. 
Compare 11 Del. Code Ann. § 768 (1995) and 72 Del. Laws, 
ch. 109 § 1 (effective July 1, 1999) (codified as amended at 
11 Del. Code Ann. § 761(f) (2000)), with 66 Del. Laws, ch. 
269, § 27 (1988). Therefore, the Delaware definition of 
“sexual contact” in 1999, and by extension the Delaware 
definition of second-degree unlawful sexual contact, was 
broader than 18 U.S.C § 2243(a)(3). See supra n. 10 and 
accompanying text. 
